Abstract. An exchange or payment protocol is considered fair if neither of the two parties exchanging items or payment at any time during the protocol has a signi cant advantage over the other entity. Fairness is an important property for electronic commerce. This paper identi es a design framework based on existing fair protocols which use o ine trusted third parties, but with convertible signatures as the underlying mechanism. We show that in principle any convertible signature scheme can be used to design a fair payment protocol. A speci c protocol is detailed based on RSA undeniable signatures which is more e cient than other similar fair payment schemes. Furthermore, in this protocol the nal signature obtained is always an ordinary RSA signature.
Introduction
As more and more electronic transactions are being conducted on insecure networks, it is becoming obvious that electronic transactions are governed by di erent forces from the ones which a ect normal physical exchanges of currency and goods. The possibility that transactions can occur remotely is one of the greatest advantages of electronic transactions as well as one of its biggest challenges to protocol designers.
In a typical physical exchange two entities, for example a customer and a shopkeeper, are present at the same location. During the exchange the customer hands the shopkeeper some notes and coins. In return the shopkeeper hands the desired goods to the customer. Unfortunately, in electronic commerce the security of this scenario is suspect because of the remoteness of the shopkeeper and the customer. It is possible that, once the customer's coins have passed through cyberspace and have been received by the shopkeeper, the shopkeeper refuses to deliver the goods; or if the shopkeeper hands the goods to the customer rst the customer may log o instead of paying the shopkeeper. These problems arise with electronic transactions because the customer and shopkeeper are separated by cyberspace. In a physical situation, if the customer attempts to take the goods without paying the shopkeeper has the option to detain him.
This problem is an obvious one to electronic transaction protocol designers. In the course of development of electronic commerce protocols, many schemes have been developed to solve the problem of electronic exchange. These protocols are referred to in the literature as fair exchange protocols. The main objective of all fair exchange protocols is to ensure that at no point during the execution of the protocol can either of the entities participating in the exchange gain any (signi cant) advantage over the other if the protocol is suddenly halted.
Previous Work
Until recently there have been two main approaches for achieving fair exchange. The rst approach is to ensure that the exchange occurs simultaneously. One way of providing simultaneous exchange is to have the participants exchange information bit by bit in an interleaving manner 15] .
The second approach is to ensure that the exchange will be completed even though one of the entities participating in the exchange refuses to continue. Fair exchange protocols which employ this approach often use a trusted third party to store the details of the transaction 8, 18] . These details are released if one of the entities refuse to complete the protocol.
The use of the trusted third party greatly reduces the e ciency of the protocol. For a once o transaction such as, say, exchange of an important contract, high e ciency need not be a priority. But for regular electronic transactions, such as remote purchase of electronic goods, e ciency is a critical issue. So most of the recent fair exchange protocols attempt to reduce the need for the trusted third party in the online execution of the transaction while ensuring that a trusted third party is always available to resolve disputes. Protocols which do not require a trusted third party during the online execution are referred to as being o ine.
The basic method for fair exchange using an o ine third party has been established in a few recent papers. This method seems rst to have been presented by Mao 12] and was followed further by Asokan, Shoup and Waidner 1] and Bao, Deng and Mao 2] . The general idea in all these papers is for one party (sometimes both parties) to send a signature to the other in such a way that: { the recipient is convinced that the signature is correct but cannot transfer the proof of correctness to other parties. { the recipient is convinced that if necessary the o ine third party will be able to make the signature available to any veri er. The recipient of such a signature should then be willing to proceed with the transaction with the knowledge that in case of dispute the third party can make the signature universally veri able. But normally the third party is not involved, thereby allowing great e ciency savings over protocols with an online trusted third party.
The way that the above properties have been achieved in previous work is that the signature is encrypted with the public key of the third party. A veri able encryption protocol is then executed between the sender and recipient of the signed message in order to achieve the second property above. Although these are all ingenious protocols they do su er from some potential drawbacks. One is that the veri able encryption protocols currently available are computationally expensive, perhaps too much so for practical use of these schemes in everyday transactions. Another drawback is that these protocols also require a large amount of storage. In order to reduce complexity of both computation and communications, non-interactive veri able encryption has been proposed. However, this raises the question of whether a non-interactive proof that a signature is encrypted is really any di erent from a signature itself, since it alone is sucient to prove to any third party that the signer has committed to the message. We believe that there is little di erence in functionality and that convertible signatures with non-interactive proofs of correctness should be avoided in our fair payment protocols.
Our Approach
In this paper new fair exchange protocols using an o ine trusted third party are proposed. The principal new idea is to make use of a well known cryptographic primitive known as a convertible signature. All the previously published o ine fair exchange schemes use the same basic idea of allowing one party, say the merchant, to be able to verify that if necessary he can employ the third party to convert a restricted commitment, veri able by the merchant, into a full signature providing non-repudiation. In other words, a signature veri able only by the merchant is converted into a universal signature. Convertible undeniable signatures provide exactly this property.
Undeniable signatures were introduced by Chaum and van Antwerpen 5]. These are digital signatures which can only be veri ed with the assistance of the signer. The signer is able to con rm or deny the ownership of the signature. No entity other than the signer is able to verify ownership of the signature. The signer is unable to prove that a valid signature is invalid or similarly that an invalid signature is valid. Convertible undeniable signatures developed by Boyar, Chaum and Damg ard 3] build on the properties of undeniable signatures. Like undeniable signatures, convertible undeniable signatures can only be veri ed with the assistance of the signer but in addition the signer is able to selectively convert a single undeniable signature into a normal digital signature or collectively convert all the signer's signatures into normal digital signatures which can be veri ed by anyone.
An extension of the idea of convertible signatures are designated converter signatures, de ned by Chaum 4] in which conversion may be achieved by a designated third party separate from the original signer. (Actually Chaum called them designated con rmer signatures, but we have changed the name to emphasize the conversion property which we are interested in. In fact in all known examples either con rmation or conversion may be achieved according to whether an interactive or non-interactive protocol is used.) These appear even more suited to application in fair exchange than ordinary convertible signatures. Surprisingly, the use of convertible signatures does not appear to have been proposed before in the context of fair exchange. Despite this each of the o ine fair exchange protocols proposed in previous papers 1, 2, 12] can be seen as a new designated converter signature algorithm! This is because veri able encryption of a signature with a designated third party's public key clearly allows that third party to convert the signature into a universally veri able one simply by decryption. In this paper we will use existing convertible signature schemes and adapt them to work for fair exchange protocols.
We explore the use of convertible undeniable signatures in fair exchange protocols with an o ine third party. We mainly concentrate on the convertible property of these signatures as the undeniable function is not necessary for fair exchange. We are able to propose a number of new protocols which are at least as e cient as any other known protocols of this type. We regard the following as the three main contributions of the current paper.
{ A general framework for fair payment in which any convertible signature scheme may be used.
{ A new fair payment protocol which is more e cient than similar fair exchange schemes.
{ A new designated converter signature for which converted signatures are ordinary RSA signatures.
Asokan, Shoup and Waidner 1] and Mao 12] exchange signatures fairly between two parties. In this paper we focus on more speci c goals in that we wish to conduct a payment transaction between a customer and a merchant. Bao, Deng and Mao 2] present two fair exchange protocols which may be used for payment. Their rst protocol is ine cient since it relies on use of veriable encryption protocols which require a high number of rounds for security. Their second protocol uses a more e cient veri able encryption protocol, but unfortunately this protocol is faulty and allows anyone to verify the customer's signature.
In section 2, we present a general design model for fair payment. Section 3 discusses use of existing convertible signature schemes within the model. A new designated converter signature is presented in detail inside the framework in section 4. An attack on the second Bao, Deng and Mao protocol is presented in the appendix.
A Framework for O ine Fair Payment Protocol Design

De nitions and Notation
The following symbols will be used to represent common parameters for the entire paper. Other parameters which are only used by speci c protocols will be de ned in the protocol description. TTP The trusted third party. It is possible that the bank could play the role of the trusted third party also but for the purpose of this paper we assume trusted third party and the bank are separate entities. m Purchase Information. This is information regarding the goods' product ID, the price to be paid for the goods as well as the merchant account number. It is assumed that this information will uniquely identify the transaction and the merchant entity.
Cert X The certi cate which veri es the public key of entity X with the appropriate certi cation authority. It also contains the customer's banking details which can only be decrypted by the bank entity and the customer's public key.
Goods The goods which are described in m. These are assumed to be software goods which can be transmitted securely encrypted across open networks.
The following notation is used to denote cryptographic operations. X and Y always represent communicating parties and may be any of the four entities de ned above.
E XY (Message) Message, encrypted with the key XY using symmetric key cryptography. It is assumed that the key is known only by X and Y and that only these entities may know the contents of Message. E X (Message) Message, encrypted with a public key belonging to X using public key cryptography. It is assumed that the public key belonging to X is known to all entities but only the entity X knows the corresponding private key to decrypt the contents of Message. Sig X (Message) Message, digitally signed by X using public key cryptography. This implies that X's public key is used to ensure that the message was transmitted by X. A message signed in this fashion can be veri ed by any entity.
S X (Message) Message, digitally signed by X using a convertible undeniable signature.
H(Message) A cryptographic function which results in a digest and checksum of Message, using an algorithm such as the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) one-way hash function.
The Design Framework
The following design framework is the model which has been used to develop the o ine fair payment protocols described in this paper. This model can be used with any convertible signature scheme to construct new o ine fair payment protocols as long as there is a way to ensure that only the third party is able to convert signatures.
The basic protocol ensures fairness by having TTP force the completion of a transaction if a dispute occurs. If no dispute occurs only C and M need to participate in the transaction.
Registration A registration protocol between the customer and third party is required for our e cient protocol in section 4. It will be correctly argued that the need for registration is an overhead which somewhat reduces the e ciency of the new protocol. However, we would like to point out that in practice trusted third parties will not be o ering their services free of charge, and registration is probably a necessary phase. It need only be carried out once to initialize the relationship between C and TTP. The purpose of the registration process is to ensure that C has been identi ed and approved by TTP. In section 4 it is speci cally used to ensure that both the trusted third party and C share keys which are to be used in the case of a dispute.
Payment The payment phase of the protocol must be conducted for each transaction. It is during this phase that M and the customer exchange goods.
It is assumed that in this phase C has already gone through a bidding process with M and that the two entities have already settled on the items to be purchased and the price to be paid. This process may be as simple as C selecting xed priced goods from M's web site. Thus C should already have all the information included in m de ned above. In step P1, C generates a partial signature of the transaction information m. The partial signature must be in such a form that only M can verify its correctness. In all our protocols M and C have to interact to verify this partial signature and this veri cation is done in step P2. Another property of the partial signature is that the trusted third party must be able to convert it into a normal signature which anyone could verify. This property is only used in case of a dispute.
Once M is satis ed that C's partial signature is valid he sends a signed copy of the requested goods to C along with the transaction information. This is done in step P3 of the protocol.
In step P4, C, on receipt of the goods, sends a normal signature to M. M can now show everyone, including the bank, that C has agreed to the transaction details in m. In practice M will follow this step with a deposit process, but we omit this from further discussion. In step D1, M sends to TTP the partial signature S(m) and an encrypted copy of the goods E TTP (Goods). The trusted third party can now convert the partial signature, which can only be veri ed by M, into a normal signature which anyone can verify.
In step D2, TTP sends the normal signature to M. TTP also sends the goods to C in step D3, in case M is trying to falsely obtain C's converter string.
We assume here that since the goods in question are information (`soft') goods neither party will gain if the goods are in fact sent twice to C in a dispute resolution. In particular for the system to work it is essential that neither party should gain from falsely engaging in a dispute.
One problem that we have not addressed here is what should happen if the soft goods become old before they can be used by C, such as might happen with travel tickets or betting slips. This is an important issue in practical applications although somewhat out of scope of our concern here which is only to ensure that M and customer fairly exchange payment for goods. In practice use of validity windows and expiry times could solve this problem; for example, TTP would use the time of dispute in conjunction with the expiry time of the soft goods to resolve the issue. Note that previous fair exchange solutions have also left this issue unresolved. Another approach to this problem was taken by Asokan, Shoup and Waidner 1] in which users are allowed to send abort messages to TTP, which keeps a record of all aborted transactions.
Security and E ciency The security of any protocol designed using this framework relies on the following properties.
Property 1. Only C can create the partially signed message S(m). If this does not hold a fraudulent customer can impersonate C in step P1
of the payment protocol by generating the partial signature and illegitimately purchase goods. Transactions would be forced despite the denial of C.
Property 2. Only M and TTP can con rm that the partial signature generated by C is valid or can convert the partial signature into a universally veri able signature.
In most cases only M needs to verify that C has produced the partial signature. If other entities were able to verify C's partial signature at any time the fairness of the payment would not be present and M would have the advantage. Property 3. If M accepts the validity of the transaction, then TTP can convert partial signature S(m) into a normal signature Sig C (m).
This property of the protocol ensures that the transaction will be completed fairly and that C does not gain an advantage over M. If this property was not provided C could refuse to send her signature in step P4 and receive the goods without payment.
Solutions using Existing Signatures
The framework of section 2 is applicable for use with a number of existing convertible signature algorithms. Due to space limitations we give only a brief outline here to allow room for more detailed discussion of the new protocol in the next section. We highlight two distinct options for using the framework. The rst is to use convertible signature schemes together with veri able encryption while the second is to use designated converter signatures.
Convertible Signatures with Veri able Encryption
In the rst practical convertible undeniable signature scheme of Boyar, Chaum and Damg ard 3], an undeniable signature consists of a triple (T; r; s) of elements in the integers modulo a large prime p 1 . The element required to convert such a signature into a universally veri able signature is the discrete log t of T. A partial signature can thus be formed by adding a copy of t encrypted with the TTP's public key to the undeniable signature. If the merchant is convinced (i) that (T; r; s) is correct and (ii) that the ciphertext really is t encrypted with TTP's public key, then he can be sure that TTP can convert the undeniable signature into a universally veri able one.
The biggest problem with such a solution is that known protocols for veriable encryption of discrete logs are not very e cient. For example, the protocol of Stadler 17] requires around 40 rounds in its interactive version. Alternative, more general, protocols due to Asokan, Shoup and Waidner 1] have the same requirement. More recent convertible undeniable protocols, such as those of Damg ard and Pedersen 6] could also be used in a similar fashion. The problem 1 It should be noted that although this scheme was successfully attacked by Michels, Petersen and Horster 13], the attack only a ects the situation where signatures are converted all at once and not converted individually as in our application.
with all these is to nd an e cient veri able encryption scheme which can be matched to the conversion information. This problem is the reason why previous fair exchange protocols have not been e cient.
Some schemes, such as those of Michels and Stadler 14] do not seem appropriate to use in this way since conversion of individual signatures works by converting an interactive proof to a non-interactive one. This means that veriable encryption of a non-interactive proof would be required to use this method.
Designated Converter Signatures
Designated converter signatures can be used in a very direct way in the framework. Con rmation by the customer during payment is essentially identical to signature con rmation. TTP takes the role of the designated converter and so can complete the dispute procedure when presented with the signature.
The rst designated converter signature protocol proposed by Chaum 4 ] is based on RSA signatures, but these signatures are never used as plain RSA signatures in the protocol. Instead the correctness of signatures is linked to knowledge of a certain discrete log. The de nition also relies on the existence of a function which destroys the multiplicative property of RSA signatures while at the same time being easy to invert.
Converted signatures in Chaum's scheme are not ordinary RSA signatures but non-interactive proofs of knowledge of a discrete log. In fact it is impossible for the signature owner in Chaum's scheme to convert signatures in the same way as the designated converter. We believe it is important in our application that signatures converted either by the owner (merchant) or the designated converter (T TP) are indistinguishable. To achieve this in Chaum's scheme, a signer who converts must recalculate a brand new designated converter signature, using a designated converter public key for which it knows the corresponding private key, and provide a non-interactive proof of correctness.
Further designated converter signatures were provided by Okamoto 16] . His constructions rely on di erent assumptions from those of Chaum but share the same properties that converted signatures are non-interactive proofs and also that conversion by owner and designated converter are di erent.
In conclusion we may say that use of existing designated converter signatures may be used within our framework. These solutions are e cient in that they require only two rounds (4 moves) to achieve high security. Their major drawback is that converted signatures are not in the form of ordinary RSA or ElGamal-type signatures which are likely to be required in electronic commerce schemes.
O ine Fair Payment using RSA Based Designated Converter Signatures
The cryptographic tools used in this new protocol are entirely based on RSA public key encryption and signatures. C splits her secret key in such a way that TTP is able to complete a partial signature of the customer. TTP can force the transaction to completion by ensuring that a complete signature can be generated. The scheme is an adaptation of the recent RSA-based undeniable signature scheme of Gennaro, Krawczyk and Rabin (GKR) 10]. Although their scheme does allow for designated con rmer signatures this still leaves the same drawbacks identi ed in the previous section if used directly for fair exchange, in particular converted signatures would not be ordinary RSA signatures.
Registration
This is an e cient protocol requiring only one signature by each party. The registration stage of the protocol need only be conducted once (or at periodic intervals) and can be used to support any number of payments whether they are disputed or not. No state information need be stored by the third party once registration is complete.
C has an RSA key pair consisting of secret exponent d, public exponent e and modulus n. In order to use the results of GKR we assume that n is a strong prime so that n = pq where p = 2p C's public key is certi ed by some certi cation authority which, in general, has no connection with TTP, but which can be used by TTP or any merchant to verify the correctness of the key. We denote this certi cate Cert C . The certi cate must assert that the modulus is correctly formed. A method for achieving this is given in the GKR paper 10].
R1: C ! TTP : Cert C When TTP receives this certi cate he generates a random number d 1 which is less than n. We require that (d 1 ; (n)) = 1 but since (n) = 4p 0 q 0 this can be practically ensured by demanding that d 1 is odd. This is to be part of the secret key which is shared between C and TTP. TTP must be able to reconstruct d 1 from the identity of C. A practical way to achieve this without demanding TTP to store data for each customer is to make d 1 = 2H(K; C) + 1 where K is a secret known only to TTP and H is a suitable hash function.
TTP then sends this key encrypted to C. This can be achieved using the public key in the certi cate Cert C .
R2a: TTP ! C : E C (d 1 ) C now calculates the second part of the secret key d 2 such that d 1 d 2 e = 1 mod (n). C must also create a reference message ! and calculate a reference signature S(!) = ! d2 . It is shown by GKR that we may safely choose ! = 2.
The reference message and signature will be used by M to verify that TTP knows d 1 and can force a transaction to completion. The reference message and signature are sent to TTP.
R2b: C ! TTP : !; S(!)
On receipt of the reference message and signature the trusted third party checks that the reference signature is valid by verifying that the following equation holds: S(!) d1e mod n = ! If the equation holds then C must have generated the reference signature correctly. TTP then creates a ticket which consists of C's public keys and the reference message and signature. TTP now signs this ticket and sends it to C. R2c: TTP ! C : Sig TTP (Cert C ; !; S(!)) C can now use this ticket to purchase goods from merchants. TTP's signature is a guarantee to the merchant who receives the ticket that the transaction can be completed by TTP if C refuses, or is unable, to complete the transaction. This is achieved by proving that a partial signature signed with d 2 is signed with the same exponent as was used to sign S(!). This is the basis of the GKR scheme.
Payment
C has to generate a partial signature of the purchase information S(m) = m d2 . (Here and below, m denotes m after preprocessing by any desired hashing and padding processes which we will not detail here.) C indicates that she wishes to conduct a payment by sending the purchase information, a partially signed version of the purchase information and the ticket received from TTP to M. 
Security and E ciency
Let us again examine the three security properties for this protocol. It is intuitively reasonable that property 1 holds if RSA signatures are secure. In fact it has been shown that breaking a multisignature with two private keys d 1 and d 2 is as hard as breaking RSA 9] . The basic idea is that if the multisignature can be broken given known signatures and partial signatures then RSA may be broken by simulating partial signatures with random d 1 values and complete signatures with the public e value. This proof easily can be adapted to include the trusted party for whom d 2 is also known. Property 2 can also be proven from the security of RSA multisignatures. Similar to the above case, an algorithm that can convert a partial signature into a complete one can be used to forge ordinary RSA signatures.
Finally, to prove property 3 we can use the properties of the GKR signature. It is proven 10, Theorem 1] that the prover (customer) in the payment protocol cannot convince the veri er (merchant) to accept an incorrect signature except with negligible probability. Thus the merchant will only accept if S(m) = m d2 .
It must be pointed out that the proofs in GKR only give con dence that signatures are true RSA signatures up to multiple by an element of order 2. To be precise, it is proven that S(m) = m d2 where is an element of order at most 2. Thus a customer could give this slight variant instead of the true RSA signature. However, in this case, on conversion the third party will obtain m d1d2 and can hence obtain . But there are only two non-trivial elements of order 2 (since it is certi ed that n is the product of only two primes) and knowledge of one of these, say , is su cient to nd a factor ( ? 1; n) of n. Hence, although C could attempt to cheat in this way, the result is that the third party can forge any signature of C.
To summarize, we can prove the following. The use of RSA signatures in this protocol allows it to be more e cient than protocols using veri able encryption. Asokan, Shoup and Waidner 1] present a general fair exchange protocol which can also be used with a range of signature and encryption schemes. This includes a scheme which also uses all RSA signatures and an encrypted signature veri cation step. But Asokan, Shoup and Waidner's protocol is less e cient in terms of messages sent by a factor of 10 when compared to the ones using designated converter signatures.
A Breaking the Bao, Deng and Mao Fair Exchange Protocol
The second protocol of Bao, Deng and Mao 2] uses veri able ElGamal encryption 7] of a Guillou-Quisquater (GQ) signature 11] to provide fair exchange.
The system wide public parameters are n; g; q; v where n = PQ is the modulus used for GQ signatures and P = 2p 0 q + 1 and Q = 2pq + 1 where P; Q; p; p 0 ; q are all primes, g is an element of order q and v is the public exponent used for GQ signatures.
A GQ signature of a message M is a pair (d; D) for which d = h(M; D v J d mod n) where h is a published one way hash function. In the protocol only D is encrypted using the public key PK TTP of TTP. ElGamal encryption is used to form the ciphertext pair (W; V TTP ) = (g w mod n; D(PK TTP ) w mod n) for a randomly chosen w. In order to bind D to the ciphertext, the value V = D v mod n is also calculated and used as part of the`challenge' c generated using a hash function H. 
